The integration of digital public infrastructure, like digital identity and wallets for accessing public and private services, has made Internet access a necessity in India. In 2024, India ranked second globally in Internet usage. Yet, only 49.15 percent of its population has Internet access, with rural and remote regions remaining significantly unconnected. This divide is not merely a matter of connectivity, it reflects the limitations of existing infrastructure. Terrestrial networks and mobile broadband, which serve most of the country, have limited reach in areas with difficult terrain or sparse populations. The cost of deploying and maintaining Internet infrastructure in remote regions is estimated to be 10 to 20 times higher than in urban areas, offering limited financial incentives for providers to expand their services.

In this context, satellite Internet is emerging as a promising alternative. Unlike terrestrial networks, satellite systems can bypass the challenges posed by geography, offering the possibility of seamless connectivity in remote regions of the country. Recognizing the potential of satellite Internet to bridge the digital divide, the Indian government has opened its satellite Internet market to private operators. However, India’s approach to satellite communications is being shaped by competing imperatives of safeguarding national security, navigating geopolitical trade pressures, and pursuing sovereignty.

New Frontier of Great Power Competition 
With a constellation of 7,578 satellites, US-based Starlink, owned by Elon Musk, dominates the global low-earth orbit satellite market. Its closest competitors, Eutelsat’s OneWeb, backed by Bharti Airtel and the United Kingdom government, with 630 satellites, Amazon’s Kuiper with 27, and Luxembourg-based SES with 9, lag significantly in scale. In recent months, Starlink has either secured operational authorizations or is on the cusp of receiving approvals in several countries, including India. Starlink’s expansion into new markets has reportedly accelerated due to US officials pushing for regulatory approvals during trade negotiations. 

Starlink’s expanding footprint has countries worried about reliance on foreign operators, and some are launching their own constellations. For instance, China aims to deploy three mega-constellations, including SpaceSail (Qianfan), Guo Wang (National Network), and the Hongyan Constellation, each of which has ambitions of deploying thousands of satellites over the next decade. Similarly, the European Union (EU) is developing Infrastructure for Resilience, Interconnectivity and Security by Satellite (IRIS²), a multi-orbital constellation, funded by entities including SES, Eutelsat, Hispasat, Airbus, and Deutsche Telekom, which seeks to provide satellite Internet across Europe. 

Expanding Satellite Connectivity in India: A Contested Terrain 
According to reports, capturing just 1 percent of India’s consumer broadband market could help Starlink generate nearly $1 billion in revenue annually. The prospect of such high returns has attracted major global satellite-based Internet operators to the Indian market. To operate in India, these companies must secure the Global Mobile Personal Communication by Satellite (GMPCS) license from the Department of Telecommunications (DoT) and authorizations from the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorization Centre (IN-SPACe). Early entrants such as Eutelsat’s OneWeb and Reliance Jio’s joint venture with SES have leveraged domestic partnerships to successfully navigate this process. In contrast, Starlink and Kuiper faced regulatory hurdles, particularly concerning data localization and foreign ownership restrictions. While Kuiper appears to be taking a cooperative approach in addressing regulatory expectations, Starlink adopted a more contentious stance. 

In 2021, Starlink began pre-selling its services in India without formal approval, prompting the DoT to intervene by directing it to obtain the necessary authorizations. Starlink also resisted India’s data localization requirements and was initially reluctant to comply with mandatory ownership disclosure norms. Indian regulations require all foreign entities operating in sensitive sectors to submit comprehensive details of their ownership structures, with specific scrutiny of investors from countries that share a land border with India, such as China. Starlink cited restrictions under US privacy laws applicable to unlisted entities to decline to disclose the investors’ list. The company did submit a declaration affirming that none of its shareholders are from such countries. However, the disclosure fell short of the regulatory requirements prescribed by Indian authorities. 

Despite these regulatory setbacks, Starlink’s entry into the Indian market gained momentum following Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to the US in February 2025. Within a month of PM Modi’s meeting with President Donald Trump and Musk, Starlink announced retail partnerships with Airtel and Jio. In May, the company received a Letter of Intent from the DoT, and in June, it was granted a GMPCS license. To begin providing services in India, Starlink needed a final regulatory clearance from India’s space agency. On July 8th, it received the IN-SPACe authorization, valid for five years from the date of issue or until the end of operational life of its constellation, whichever comes first. In contrast, Kuiper, which was at a similar stage in the approval process, continued to face delays in securing regulatory approval. 

While Trump’s tariff policies do not explicitly target satellite Internet services, India’s geopolitical priorities and ongoing trade negotiations with the US appear to be facilitating Starlink’s entry into India. Musk’s close relationship with Trump may have further influenced India’s decision to expedite Starlink’s regulatory clearance, including exempting key regulatory mandates such as full ownership disclosure. The opaque authorization process raises critical questions about procedural fairness in the satellite communication market. 

While framed as complementary technologies, satellite and terrestrial networks are increasingly vying for the same broadband market. Although trade imperatives have facilitated Starlink’s entry into the Indian market, its dominance in the business-to-business (B2B) and business-to-consumer (B2C) segments is not guaranteed. OneWeb is focusing on B2B services, whereas Jio will cater to both B2B and B2C markets. In the B2C segment, Jio’s venture holds a competitive advantage due to its established market trust and extensive telecommunication network infrastructure. Starlink faces challenges not just in B2C and B2B segments but also for government contracts, as Indian authorities may prefer operators with domestic roots like OneWeb (partly owned by Bharti Global) and Jio Space Technologies (a joint venture with SES). Starlink’s close affiliation with the US government and Musk’s positions, especially during the Ukraine-Russia conflict, may lead India to approach defense-related partnerships with caution. For instance, OneWeb has already begun providing services to Indian defense personnel under a provisional license. 

The underlying competition between terrestrial and satellite broadband is evident in India’s unresolved spectrum allocation debate. The government’s decision to administratively assign spectrum to Starlink has drawn fierce opposition from domestic telecom networks like Airtel and Jio, who argue that it creates an uneven playing field, favoring satellite operators. Notably, the policy diverges from Starlink’s demand for a twenty-year licence, instead imposing a licensing term of five years and four percent adjusted gross revenue as usage charges. This move appears to be an attempt by the Indian authorities to balance competing interests, but it faces legal scrutiny. Critics of the decision contend it violates the Supreme Court’s 2G spectrum ruling, which mandates a “fair and transparent process for allocating spectrum.” The outcome of these challenges will determine whether India prioritizes interoperability with global standards over domestic telecom interests. The spectrum debate raises critical questions about the balance of power between state and commercial actors—to what degree can satellite providers leverage their geopolitical connections to shape policy outcomes?

Balancing State Control and National Security
In addition to its geopolitical priorities, the Indian government is increasing regulatory oversight to mitigate national security risks. During the recent terror attack in Pahalgam in Kashmir, India, unauthorized Huawei-based satellite phones were allegedly used to circumvent the ability of security agencies to monitor communications in the region. As satellite signals traverse international jurisdictions, it is challenging for national authorities to monitor and control communications over the LEO-satellite infrastructure. For example, in 2024, unauthorized Starlink devices were seized in the conflict-ridden and border areas of India. Allegations were raised about these devices being used by militants to circumvent the Internet shutdown imposed in Manipur and by drug smugglers to navigate the deep sea in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Starlink denied Indian authorities’ request for information on seized devices, though Musk clarified on social media that unauthorized access was not possible as Starlink’s signal was turned off over India. Such incidents and Starlink’s non-cooperation prompted the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) to direct DoT to implement necessary measures to avoid circumvention of geographic restrictions.

Complying with the MHA’s directive, the DoT has amended the security mandatesfor GMPCS license holders. To facilitate state monitoring, the amended license requires all communications to be routed through domestic gateways and operators to establish control centers for direct communication with Indian authorities. Operators are required to “actively monitor” user activities within areas designated as Special Monitoring Zones and Exclusive Economic Zones by the government. The license also places restrictions on cross-border flows of data, mandating localization of data such as commercial records, call details, and IP details to be stored within India and prohibiting this data from being transferred, decrypted, or duplicated outside the country. Operators must enforce government-issued website blocking orders and restrict services to specific individuals, groups, or entire regions during conflicts. Additionally, they are responsible for ensuring geofencing in debarred regions, particularly border areas. The amended license also serves an industrial policy objective: to encourage local production of technologies. All GMPCS license holders are required to put in place a manufacturing program that indigenizes at least 20 percent of their ground segment of the satellite network. 

These security mandates fail to address critical vulnerabilities stemming from trading technological dependence for operational convenience. Nations dependent on foreign tech firms risk losing autonomy when the commercial interests of tech firms fuse with the interests and strategic or security objectives of specific governments. For example, as recently as February this year, US officials have attempted to use restricting Starlink access as diplomatic leverage over Ukraine. Since 2022, Starlink has restricted services multiple times, by geofencingnear front lines or otherwise, which has impacted both Ukrainian and Russian forces. In late 2023, Starlink refused activation near Crimea, preventing a planned Ukrainian attack on Russian forces in the region. In May 2024, the US Department of Defense restricted Russia’s access to Starlink. However, Russia found a way to circumvent these restrictions by procuring Starlink devices through black-market websites and fitting Starlink dishes on its military drones to attack Ukraine. Following the recent US sanctions against the International Criminal Court (ICC), triggered by its arrest warrants for Israeli officials, Microsoft, a US-based tech giant, swiftly complied, cutting off the ICC prosecutor’s access to emails. 

Such incidents demonstrate how geopolitical conflicts now extend into the global digital communications infrastructure, which is increasingly being used to achieve foreign policy goals. The GMPCS license enables the Indian state to control access to data, information, and service delivery. However, it does not address challenges that India will face when foreign firms act as tools of coercive statecraft. 

India’s push for satellite Internet reflects a dual imperative: bridging its digital divide while safeguarding national security in an increasingly contested technological landscape. Despite growing competition in the satellite Internet market, a fundamental question persists: can satellite Internet effectively serve India’s population in rural and remote regions? Satellite Internet is significantly more expensive than terrestrial Internet or mobile broadband in both underserved and well-connected areas. As a result, even though access will be technically available, many people might remain unconnected due to financial constraints in India’s remote regions. This marks a shift in the nature of the digital divide—from an issue of accessibility to one of affordability. 

While satellite technology may offer a viable solution for remote connectivity, its integration into India’s digital infrastructure comes with geopolitical strings attached. The expedited regulatory clearances for Starlink, juxtaposed with delays for competitors, underscore how trade diplomacy and strategic alliances, rather than pure market logics, are shaping India’s satellite policies. Yet reliance on foreign operators introduces vulnerabilities, and as seen in Ukraine, Russia, and ICC sanctions cases, technology services can become entangled in geopolitical upheavals. India is attempting to address some of these concerns, though its approach has been limited to introducing data routing and localization requirements. These measures can go so far, and India needs to think deeply about balancing open markets with national priorities in an interconnected global system. 

Photo credit: Stock photo by Vecteezy

This piece was originally published by the Center for the Advanced Study of India (CASI) at the University of Pennsylvania. 

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